A Critique of Habermas' Theory of Practical Rationality

DISCUSSION

A CR I T I QUE OF HABERMAS '

THEORY OF

PRACT I CAL

RAT I ONAL I TY

ABSTRACT. Habermas' theory of practical rationality is a significant theoretical attempt to preserve both rationality and democracy at the level of political decision making that transcends both technocratic and decisionistic theories of rationality. Habermas' theory of rationality accords with his epistemological, sociological, psy- chological, and linguistic premises. His theory, however, overlooks the interactions between instrumental action and symbolic interaction, the"relevance of professional knowledge of facts for the choice of ends, the conflict between the norms of efficiency and democracy, and the duality of subject and object in historical formation. The rational interest in reproduction of free communication, however, can be used to reformulate Habermas' theory of rationality. The notion of rational action is a familiar concept in economics and sociological theory. Rational action is usually characterized by the choice of the most efficient means for the attainment of a given end. 1 The immediate problem with this definition is that it leaves the question of the ends undecided and undefined. Consequently two types of rationality have been distinguished from one another. Instrumental rationality refers to the rationality of means, while practical rationality deals with the rationality of ends. With the exception of some hermeneutical-histoficist writers, 2 there is a general agreement on the part of theorists to define instrumental rationality on the basis of the logic of efficiency and the use of scientific knowledge. It is the question of practical rationality, however, which is subject to diverse interpreta- tions and formulations. According to "decisionistic theory" practical issues are neither rational nor irrational. 3 Instead they are merely "non-rational". 4 For "technocratic theory", on the contrary, practical rationality is reduced to instrumental rationality, s Habermas' theory of practical rationality is a significant attempt for a new synthesis of deci- sionistic and technocratic theories. 6 In this paper I locate Habermas' theory of rationality within the context of his critical system and examine some of the limitations of his theory. The concluding section of the paper will try new lines of potential reformulation of the theory of practical rationality.

Studies in Soviet Thought 33 (1987) 251--265. © 1987 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.

252

DISCUSSION

A. HABERMAS' CRITICAL CONSENSUS THEORY OF PRACTICAL RATIONALITY

Habermas' definition of practical rationality follows the Kantian theory of ethics and politics. For Kant, moral issues do not belong to the particularistic realm of sentiments. Instead, moral questions are subject to rational judgment. Contrary to the technocratic theorists, Kant's logic of practical rationality is not reducible to the logic of instrumental rationality. In Kantian philosophy this point is emphasized by a sharp distinction between "theoretical" and "practical" reason. While the former deals with the world of phenomena, the latter is applicable to the kingdom of ends and noumenal realm of things-in-themselves. 7 Habermas' theory of rationality is a synthesis of decisionistic and technocratic theories. According to Habermas, when the choice of practical questions is involved, there can exist no expertise or pro- fessionalism. The rational choice of ends and values is achieved through democratic participation and voting by all the interested individual par- ticipants. Rational political choice is precisely the consensus-outcome of this democratic voting process. This consensus, however, is only a true consensus if there exists an "ideal speech situation", i.e., a situation in which all the political alternatives have equal chance to speak to the public,s Public critical debate and free communication are the formal preconditions of practical rationality. In such a genuine democratic situation, consensual policies are rational political choices. This implies that there exist no possibilities of a priori definition or prediction of the rational practical alternatives independent from, and prior to, the debate and voting of the individual participants. Practical rationality is defined by Habermas in a methodological but not substantive manner.

B. RATIONALITY AND CRITIQUE IN HABERMASIAN CRITICAL THEORY

Habermas' theory of practical rationality is an appealing theoretical construct with strong humanitarian and democratic premises. My criticisms of Habermas' theory are not intended to challenge the humanistic and democratic elements of his theory. Instead, my critique is directed at the sociological and political feasibility of his vision of

DISCUSSION

253

rational society. Before discussing my objections to his theory, I would like to explicate Habermas' arguments for the possibility and feasibility of critique and rationality. This in turn requires locating the theory of practical rationality within the general context of his ontological and epistemological critical system. Habermas' theory of practical ration- ality is based upon, and supported by, fundamental premises of his sociological, methodological, linguistic, and psychological assumptions. (1) At a sociological level Habermas' notion of practical rationality is based upon his theory of the unity of subject and object, his theory of the autonomy of symbolic interactions from the realm of instrumental action, and his theory of reification and ideology. In fact, the basic premises of his system can ultimately be understood in terms of his historicist assumption of the unity of subject and object in socio- historical reality. For Habermas, the basic ontological characteristics of society are that a society is created by the actions and interactions of individual human beings and has no independent "natural" existence outside human relations.9 In this regard, Habermas' critical theory radically departs from a structuralistic perspective and emphasizes human agency and the significance of meanings and consciousness in historical development.1° But if society is created by the actions and interactions of individuals, it is natural to argue that a rational society, i.e., a society determined by the conscious democratic decisions of its individual members, is an objective and concrete possibility. Moreover, according to Habermas the creation of society by human beings takes place through the two autonomous systems of instrumental action and symbolic interaction. Rejecting economistic Marxism, Habermas con- trasts the dialogic nature of institutional, normative arrangements to the monological character of technology and forces of production. 11 The assumption of the qualitative autonomy of institutional norms from the logic of instrumental action is used by Habermas to criticize a tech- nocratic reduction of practical rationality to the level of instrumental rationality. This in turn explains Habermas' definition of a rational society in terms of the rule of both technological professionalism and democracy. Finally, Habermas' assumption of the possibility of rationality is implicit in his theory of reification and ideology. According to him, society is created by individuals, but individuals can create society in a

254

DISCUSSION

conscious or unconscious manner. If the construction of social reality by individuals is made unconsciously, a contradiction will exist between the intentions and the outcome of actions. Consequently, the solution for such a discrepancy is critique, self-consciousness, and democratic participation. In this way, the gap between consciousness and social structure would cease to exist. 12 Structuralist theory of a natural contradiction between structure and consciousness, therefore, is con- ceived by Habermas to be an ideological and false consciousness. While Althusser's structuralism finds historicism ideological t3, Habermas' theory defines ideology in terms of the reification of socio-historical reality. But if democracy can properly link consciousness to social structures, as Habermas assumes, practical rationality must be defined in terms of the premises of critical consensus theory. (2) The epistemological and methodological premises of Habermas' theory provide further support for his position on the question of rationality. His theory of the objective interests of various types of knowledge, his theory of hermeneutics and depth-hermeneutics, and his notion of critique are clear methodological grounds for Habermas' theory of rationality. Corresponding to his ontological distinction between the systems of actions and interaction, Habermas specifies two fundamental interests that underlie human cognitive activities. The interest in power, control, and domination relates to the instrumental and technological aspect of the construction of historical reality by human subjects.14 The activity of symbolic construction, however, corresponds to objective interests in intersubjectivity and increasing communication among the subjects.15 The conditions of the possibility of truth should be sought in terms of the fulfillment of these objective interests. It is clear that practical rationality is defined through the requirements of the objective interest in expansion of communication and consensus while instrumental rationality deals with the interest in control and mastery over nature. Habermas' notion of knowledge and interest leads to his classification of the sciences. While the science of nature is monological, hermeneutics and the mode of social sciences is dialogical. 16 Again, Habermas' theory of practical rationality cor- responds to the logic of socio-historical understanding and aims at dialogue and definition of norms and meanings through free communi- cation.

DISCUSSION

255

As to the theory of rationality, however, the most relevant method- ological issue is to be found in Habermas' notion of critique. Critique is an attempt at self-reflection and self-consciousness by the subject.~ It aims at emancipation from the bondage of the unconscious and the irrational. Critique is a program of depth-hermeneutics, a discovery of unconscious meanings in a situation of distorted and dominated communication. In other words, critique attempts to destroy alienation and reification.17 Critique is best characterized by a unique relation between knowledge and interest. Reason is always an interested reason. But while in the natural sciences reason is interested in control and domination, in critical knowledge reason is interested in reason itself. Critique is defined as the unity of reason and interest} 8 Habermas' notion of practical rationality is the ultimate realization of critique. Reason's search for rationality is realized in democracy and conscious construction of social reality by human subjects. (3) The third systematic argument for Habermas' theory of ration- ality can be found in his theory of language and communication. The emphasis on symbol and sign as the model of social action and social reality is common to both structuralists and hermeneutic-historicists. But while structuralists emphasize the unconscious structures of language] 9 historicists, on the other hand, insist upon the reflexive and intentional aspects of speech acts.z° Habermasian theory of the "universal prag- matic" is a theory of the formal a priori structures of speech acts. According to Habermas, the universal pragmatic as a reconstructive knowledge is different from linguistics. The formal and universal presuppositions of an utterance are different from the universal presup- positions of sentence structures. Habermas maintains that a sentence is placed in relation to: (1) the external reality of what is supposed to be an existing state of affairs: (2) the internal reality of what a speaker would like to express before an audience of his/her intention, and; (3) the normative reality of what is intersubjectively recognized as a legitimate interpersonal relationship. It is thereby placed under validity claims that it need not and cannot fulfill as a non-situated sentence, as a purely grammatical formation. In addition to comprehensibility, Habermas notes, a successful utterance must satisfy three more validity claims: it must count as true for the participants insofar as it repre- sents something in the world; it must count as truthful insofar as it

256

DISCUSSION

expresses something intended by the speaker; and it must count as fight insofar as it conforms to socially recognized expectations. 21Undistorted communication implies that all validity claims are agreed upon by the participants in dialogue. As soon as any of the validity claims is doubted by a hearer, the communicative act stops. In this case, "argumentative discourse" should take place. In a discourse, the force of the argument is the only criterion, and the correctness of norms is corroborated by consensus achieved through argumentative reasoning. 22 We can see that Habermas' theory of universal pragmatic corresponds with his theory of rationality. In fact, the claim of rationality is assumed by Habermas to be inherent in the formal presuppositions of speech acts and dialogue. It is interesting to see that Habermas' distinction between "elocutionary" and "propositional" structures of utterance correspond to his notions of practical rationality and instrumental rationality, respectively.23 (4) Finally, I should briefly refer to Habermas' assumptions with regard to human psychology as an anthropological premise of his theory of rationality. Contrary to the structuralist perception of the individual as passive embodiment of social relations, Habermasian theory finds the structural definition and requirement of a rational society already present in the logic of the personality development of individuals. For Habermas, the basic dynamics of personality develop- ment is a move toward increasing autonomy, self-consciousness, and responsibility. Identity, Habermas argues, is produced through two successive stages of "socialization" and "individuation". 24 While the stage of socialization is represented by the development of "natural identity" and later "role identity", the stage of individuation is charac- terized by development of an "ego identity".25 It is at this stage of "ego identity" that the process of need-interpretation -- which until then depended on an uncontrolled cultural tradition -- can itself become the object of discursive will-formation.26 Habermas' psychological theories are mostly influenced by Kohlberg's stages of moral consciousness, re- formulated within a general action-theory framework. 27 It is interesting to see that Habermas' positive conception of personality development not only accords with his theory of rationality, but also finds parallels between historical developments and personality dynamics.28

DISCUSSION

257

C. CRITICISM OF HABERMAS' THEORY OF RATIONALITY

Habermas' systematic theory of rationality is definitely an important contribution to philosophy and the social sciences. In particular, the humanitarian and democratic premises of the theory are admirably insightful. The aesthetic and moral beauty of Habermas' theory, how- ever, cannot overcome its serious sociological misconceptions and shortcomings. In this paper, I am not concerned with a review of the literature of the criticisms expressed against Habermas' theory. Instead, I shall raise some sociological objections to Habermas' definition of practical rationality, and briefly criticize his notions of critique and free communication as the basis of rational policy-making. The fundamental problem with Habermas' theory of rationality is its rigid and sharp differentiation between the realm of ends and the realm of means, corresponding to the normative and technical social struc- tures, respectively. This does not mean that I advocate an economisfic reduction of symbolic interactions to the realm of instrumental actions. On the contrary, I emphasize a mutual interaction between the two systems. Habermas confuses his analytical and abstract dichotomy of the two systems with concrete reality, and that, in turn, leads to a naive formulation of his theory of rationality. More specifically, Habermas' rigid differentiation between systems of actions and interaction leads to a false assumption of the neutrality of technology, a naive rejection of the relevance of professional knowledge of facts for the choice of ends, and a utopian belief in the absolute harmony of the norms of efficiency and democracy. Let us consider these issues in more substantive detail. Habermas assumes that the rationality of means is independent from practical questions. For Habermas, there exist objective, practical interests underlying both technological knowledge and instrumental choice. This dialogical and practical precondition of the monological structure of natural science is the pragmatic interest in the domination and control of nature. Therefore a scientific statement is true if it fulfills this interest. But aside from this general, quasi-transcendental interest, the question of efficiency and the rationality of means is perceived by Habermas to be independent of practical considerations. That is why the choice of technical alternatives is determined by the use of pro- fessional scientific knowledge defined in a monological fashion. There

258

DISCUSSION

are, however, serious problems with this assumption. The practical choice of values is not only relevant to the choice of ends but to the choice of means for implementing the ends as well. An efficient choice of instrumental alternatives is based upon a cost-benefit analysis of various alternatives. Definition of costs and benefits, however, is mostly a practical issue. In fact, one significant arena of political struggle concerns the inclusion or exclusion of different damages or utilities in the realm of the relevant and effective calculation of costs and benefits. For example, ecological and generational consequences of technical choices are not included within the Liberalist logic of private capital. 29 In other words, the definition of efficiency and instrumental rationality presupposes a constant choice -- implicit or explicit -- of political and practical alternatives. Habermas' notion of interest in control and domination as the quasi- transcendental ground of natural sciences may also be questioned. Habermas' identification of the underlying interest of natural science and technology definitely reflects the cultural categories of the his- torical!y specific stage of Western industrial societies. Marcuse, for example, advocates the necessity of a dialogical conception of nature- human relations, an emphasis on interest in harmony rather than domination, and a non-neutral perception of technology.B° In addition to the quasi-transcendental interests, however, there are multitudes of practical and dialogical factors that are involved in the theoretical practice of natural sciences. Basically, Habermas comes close to a positivistic perception of the categories and logic of natural sciences. The meaning of the terms of propositions within scientific discourse, however, is defined and determined by the theoretical context, theore- tical assumptions, and structural totality of the propositions. 31 In other words, the model of ordinary language is not entirely alien to the structure of discourse in natural sciences. The logical positivist's notion of the meaning of terms as objective, isolated, representational and de- notative phenomena 32, modified but ultimately accepted by Habermas, is a very questionable theoretical standpoint. An important sociological problem with Habermas' theory of ration- ality is the naive assumption of the neutral character of technology. The fact that technological changes lead to institutional and cultural transformations does not need detailed argumentation. This implies that

DISCUSSION

259

a specific system of action has significant impact upon the normative system. The idea that the technology in itself is neither good nor bad, that it has significant impact upon the normative system; and that it is the use of technology which makes it positive or negative, is very simplistic. Technology, to some extent, dictates its own useY The practical significance of technology is becoming more pronounced with the invasion of technology into the domains of the human body and soul. Examples of this recent development can be found in research in the areas of genetic engineering and artificial intelligence. Even the traditional distinction between a neutral invention and a partisan innovation is becoming obsolete by the logic and form of contemporary research and technology. My major criticism of Habermas' theory of practical rationality, however, is related to his naive isolation of practical issues from instrumental ones. Basically, for Habermas there exists no profession- alism at the level of practical questions, and consequently rational ends are defined through the consensus of the people in a situation of free debate and communication. Unfortunately, reality is not that simple. (1) Any political choice among alternative policy issues presupposes assumptions about the concrete and factual consequences of these policies. If political choice is restricted to empty rhetoric concerning abstract words -- like "equality", "freedom", and "justice" -- Habermas' model of rational politics might be realizable. Probably tyrants and dictators would also vote for justice, liberty, and freedom. But if political choice and practical decision deal with alternative institutional arrangements and concrete policy issues, and expression of preference or vote for or against alternative policies requires factual data con- cerning the social, economic, cultural, and political consequences of various policies. Therefore, even if the analytical autonomy of ends from means is accepted, the knowledge of statements of fact remains directly relevant and necessary for rational practical choice. Long ago, Max Weber recognized the significance of the social sciences for political choice.34 But if rational practical choice presupposes sociological knowledge, then the Habermasian definition of practical rationality cannot be accepted. There are at least two reasons for this: First, sociological, economic, and political knowledge is not shared by the masses. Second,

260

DISCUSSION

even if every citizen earned a Ph.D. in social science, the fact remains that different social theories and models propose different descriptions of facts and envision different forms of consequences for political alternatives. (2) Even if we assume that intellectuals, in an ideal speech situation, would present alternative policies, and their related facts, to the public in order to create an enlightened citizenry, there is no reason to think that those citizens will reach political consensus. First of all, intellec- tuals themselves hold contradictory ideas and assumptions, and their conflict of attitude will probably increase as the complexity of society increases. Second, Habermas overlooks the question of interests in political choice. Certainly conflicts of interest create differential voting and preferences even when there is consensus on factual statements. Habermasian rational subjects are purely transcendental subjects who vote not on the basis of their concrete conflicts and interests but solely for aesthetical-altruistic reasons. Third, Habermas overlooks the specific interests of intellectuals in maintaining their distance from laymen. Intellectuals may be institutionally interested in free speech and debate within the scientific community, but they are also interested in keeping their complex, and sometimes esoteric, form of discourse and vocabulary beyond the comprehension of the public. Such an institu- tional interest implies that intellectuals may not adequately fulfill their task of mediating between the public and sociological knowledgeY Fourth, there is no doubt that intellectuals who believe in different theoretical paradigms are rarely involved in debate and commtmication with each other. Actually there are not many radical or conservative theorists who do not find discourse on politics with opposing groups futile. This distorted communication is partly due to conflicting under- lying assumptions and partly due to non-rational influences. In concrete reality the question of political discourse has much to do with rhetoric and persuasion. To assume a public that is armed against rhetoric is again another projection of naive idealism onto the arena of social reality. Finally, Habermas' theory of practical rationality may be claimed to suffer from internal inconsistency. If voting in the context of free communication is the sole defining criterion of the rationality of ends, interest in maintaining free communication should also be an inherently

261

D I SCUS S I ON

rational value. But the decision concerning the consequences of various policies for the system of communication and authority is an extremely complicated issue that presupposes an exact and total sociological knowledge. This implies that even if the hypothetical situation of free communication could be realized, our inadequate knowledge of society and history renders the rationality of political choices problematic. Lastly, Habermas' theory of rationality overlooks the complex forms of interrelations and interactions between the systems of action and interactions. The only "point emphasized by Habermas in this regard is Marcuse's notion of "surplus repression".36 Ultimately for Habermas, technological development and the rationality of instrumental systems create increasing possibilities for democracy and practical rationality. Marx' theory of forces and relations of production foreshadows Habermas' extreme optimism. According to Marx, the technological developments of advanced capitalist societies contradict the alienating structure of captalist social relations and correspond to a new form of authority structure that is egalitarian, democratic, and non-alienating.37 Likewise for Habermas technology is either neutral or exerts a positive influence on democracy. Reality, however, is more complex than this utopian picture of social dynamics. It might be argued, for example, that there can exist contradictions between the norms of efficiency and democracy. This is clearly reflected in two different visions of socialism. Socialism can be conceived either as a centralized and planning state or as a decentralized and production-for-use-oriented society. Unfor- tunately, the centralized, bureaucratic state with central planning for the entire economy is not all democratic. Habermas' practical rationality is virtually impossible to achieve in such a society. The planning model of socialism, however, might experience some instrumental rationality. Actually, the political strategy of Stalinism was based upon the develop- ment of the forces of production at the expense of democratic social relations. On the other hand, a decentralized model of socialism that may be able to experience popular democracy and participation in decision-making seems to contradict the norms of efficiency and technological complexity. The potential conflict between instrumental and practical rationality is manifest in the classic criticism of capitalism by Marx. Capitalism, for Marx, is characterized, among other things, by a general contradiction between the rationality of parts and the

262

DISCUSSION

irrationality of the whole. Since economic decisions are made by isolated individuals, the societal outcomes are a blind product of the interaction of individuals' actions. The totality, in other words, is not subject to rational, conscious and reflective decision making. 38 What is overlooked in this analysis, however, is that subjugation of the totality to "reason" requires centralized planning. The alienating, undemocratic, bureaucratic, technocratic, and class character of such a form of society is already established within various theories of neo-Marxism. The alternative decentralized vision of socialism, however, resembles capi- talism in terms of the irrationality of the totality. I should emphasize that I am not advocating an "iron law of oligarchy" or an inevitable contradiction between democracy and efficiency. In fact, I believe that our knowledge of social forces and dynamics is too limited to allow universal and a priori judgments on issues like this. Whether Ellul's pessimistic view of the totalitarian implications of complex technology is true 39, or whether Toffier's optimistic accounts of the democratic consequences of computer technology is right 4°, it is very difficult to decide in a categorical fashion. My point is simply that Habermas' uncritical a priori assump- tion of the harmony of instrumental and practical rationality is a very dubious idea. The underlying problem with Habermas' utopian optimism and his theory of rationality seems to lie in his historicist assumption of the unity of subject and object in socio-historical reality. For Habermas, the contradiction between social structures and individually intended mean- ings and consciousness is a historically specific phenomenon that can be eliminated in a democratic society. That is why depth-hermeneutics is a historically specific form of analysis. The fact, however, is that even with the elimination of capitalism and commodity fetishism, the inadequate knowledge of humans with regard to their actions, inter- actions, and institutions will remain an integral fact of social life. Consequently, the potential forms of conflict between the intentions and the objective outcomes of human interactions will not be tran- scended. Depth-hermeneutics, in other words, is not a temporary logic D. CONCLUS I ON

DISCUSSION

263

of sociological analysis, but a permanent and essential aspect of social research. It might be possible to draw a general outline and formal theory of the fundamental requirements of a rational morality and politics. For Habermas, an a priori decision on practical issues does not eonforrri to the norm of rationality. However, Habermas' notion of free communi- cation as the formal precondition of rational politics is not only an a priori practical preference, but also may constitute a general criterion for decisions on practical issues. More specifically, the interest in the existence of free communication and the reproduction and maintenance of free discourse are both rational interests. Therefore, even if in a specific discourse there is consensus, we can reject the rationality of consensus if it does not conform to any of our two universal interests. This implies that a majority tyranny cannot be considered rational because it contradicts at least the interest in reproduction of free communication. Furthermore, those societal, economic, and political arrangements that contradict the interest in free discourse can be ruled irrational. This means, however, that Habermas' hypothetical situation of ideal speech might result in an irrational consensus. This is particu- larly the case when, due to lack of exact sociological knowledge, the objective outcome of the consensual policy undermines the structure of free communication. In conclusion, I would argue that (a) values are not reducible to the level of facts, and individuals are the best judges of their own interests. Hence, the inadequacy of the technocratic model. (b) The individual rational practical choice presupposes autonomy. Autonomy, however, requires free societal communication and ideal speech situations; whence the inadequacy of the decisionistic and historicist theory of practical relativism. (c) Although values are not reducible to the level of facts, they are not entirely disassociated from factual considerations. Furthermore, the autonomy of social institutions from individual inten- tions, and the reality of the unintended consequences of alternative policies create the possibility of "irrational consensus". Hence the inadequacy of Habermas' theory of rationality. (d) We should expect an increasing level of disagreement and diversity of opinion among the more intellectual and enlightened citizens. In other words, it is unlikely that democracy and critical debate will lead to increased consensus on

264

DISCUSSION

substantive policy issues. (e) Finally, rational practical choice requires not only democracy and public participation but also enlightenment and technical, socio-economic knowledge. Although democracy and enlightenment do not lead to consensus on substantive issues, they may well lead to a methodological consensus upon the issues of legitimacy and peaceful strategies of conflict resolution.

NOTES

1 See T. Parsons, The Structure of SocialAction, 1949, Free Press, pp. 43--86. 2 A historieist rejection of the definition of instrumental rationality in terms of scien- tific knowledge can be found in P. Winch, The Idea of a Social Science, 1958, Routledge and Kegan Paul. 3 An example of the rejection of the possibility of practical rationality may be found in: M. Weber, The Methodology of Social Sciences, 1949, Free Press, pp. 50--57. 4 A recent work emphasizing the non-rationalistic theory of practical rationality is J. C. Alexander's Theoretical Logic in Sociology: Positivism Presuppositions, and Current Controversies, 1982, University of California Press, pp. 64-- 126. 5 A brief discussion of Luhman's technocratic theory can be found in: F. W. Sixel, 'The Problem of Sense: Habermas vs. Luhman' in J. O'Neill (ed.), On Critical Theory, 1976, Continuum Books, pp. 184--205. 6 Such a synthesis is exemplified in J. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, 1984, Beacon Press. 7 I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1964, Macmillan & Co. 8 j. Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, 1975, Beacon Press, pp. 107--8. 9 j. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, 1971, Beacon Press, pp. 113--160. 10 See, for example, C. L6vi-Strauss, The Savage Mind, 1966, University of Chicago Press, pp. 245--270. 11 j. Habermas, 1971, pp. 161--186. 12 Ibid., pp. 246--273. 13 L. Althusser, ForMarx, 1979, Verso, pp. 231--356. 14 j. Habermas, 1971, pp. 91--139. a5 Ibid.,pp. 161--186. 16 Ibid., pp. 161--165. 17 Ibid., pp. 274--300 18 j. Habermas, 1971, pp. 189--213. 19 L. Althusser, 'Freud and Laean', New Left Review, No. 55, May--June 1960, pp. 48--66. 2o See M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 1962, Routledge and Kegan Paul, pp. 174--202. 21 j. Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, 1979, Beacon Press, pp. 1--68.

22 Ibid., pp. 59--68. 23 IBM., pp. 41--68. 24 Ibid., pp. 95--129.

D I SCUS S I ON

2 6 5

25 Ibid., pp. 68--94. 26 Ibid., pp. 84--86. 27 Ibid., pp. 73--90. 28 Ibid., pp. 130--177.

29 The literature on externalities and spill-over costs represents a partial recognition of this issue within neo-classical economic theory. See R. Marris, (ed.), The Corporate Society, 1974, Macmillan Press, pp. 251--399. 30 H. Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, 1962, Vintage Books, pp. 96--114. 31 For an example of the contextual theory of meaning see T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1970, University of Chicago Press. 32 See A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 1952, Dover Publications. 33 Extreme statements of this position may be found in Veblen, McLuhan, and Ellul. See. L. Winner, Autonomous Technology, 1977, MIT Press, pp. 237--305. 34 M. Weber, 'The Meaning of Ethical Neutrality' in Methodology of the Social Sciences, 1949, Free Press, pp. 19--27. 3s An insightful discussion of the contradictory interests of intellectuals can be found in A. W. Gouldner, The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class, 1979, Seabury Press. 3~ j. Habermas, 1971, pp. 280--2. 37 K. Marx, Capital, Vol. I. 1967. International Publishers, pp. 484--488. 3s K. Marx, Capital, Vol. I. 1977, Vintage Books, pp. 163--77. 39 j. Ellul, The TechnologicalSociety, 1970, Alfred Knopf, pp. 428--36. 40 A. Toffier, The Third Wave, 1980, William Morrow & Company, pp. 408--460.

Carleton College, Department of Sociology~Anthropology, Northfield, MN 55057, U.S.A.

NADER SA I ED I