A Critique of Habermas' Theory of Practical Rationality

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DISCUSSION

irrationality of the whole. Since economic decisions are made by isolated individuals, the societal outcomes are a blind product of the interaction of individuals' actions. The totality, in other words, is not subject to rational, conscious and reflective decision making. 38 What is overlooked in this analysis, however, is that subjugation of the totality to "reason" requires centralized planning. The alienating, undemocratic, bureaucratic, technocratic, and class character of such a form of society is already established within various theories of neo-Marxism. The alternative decentralized vision of socialism, however, resembles capi- talism in terms of the irrationality of the totality. I should emphasize that I am not advocating an "iron law of oligarchy" or an inevitable contradiction between democracy and efficiency. In fact, I believe that our knowledge of social forces and dynamics is too limited to allow universal and a priori judgments on issues like this. Whether Ellul's pessimistic view of the totalitarian implications of complex technology is true 39, or whether Toffier's optimistic accounts of the democratic consequences of computer technology is right 4°, it is very difficult to decide in a categorical fashion. My point is simply that Habermas' uncritical a priori assump- tion of the harmony of instrumental and practical rationality is a very dubious idea. The underlying problem with Habermas' utopian optimism and his theory of rationality seems to lie in his historicist assumption of the unity of subject and object in socio-historical reality. For Habermas, the contradiction between social structures and individually intended mean- ings and consciousness is a historically specific phenomenon that can be eliminated in a democratic society. That is why depth-hermeneutics is a historically specific form of analysis. The fact, however, is that even with the elimination of capitalism and commodity fetishism, the inadequate knowledge of humans with regard to their actions, inter- actions, and institutions will remain an integral fact of social life. Consequently, the potential forms of conflict between the intentions and the objective outcomes of human interactions will not be tran- scended. Depth-hermeneutics, in other words, is not a temporary logic D. CONCLUS I ON